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Abstract 
 
In the first chapter, we analyze the role of market development, risk premium, and 
transparency as factors influencing the value of cash in firms listed as American Depository 
Receipts. Based on the method by Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002), our primary results are as 
follows. The market value of cash is greater on average for ADR firms than for U.S. firms, and 
within the ADR sample the value of cash is greater for firms based in less developed countries 
after 2007 financial crisis but not before. Together, the results suggest that the market 
development is especially important during more volatile periods. Further, the value of cash is 
negatively associated with the market risk premium. In addition, the relation between insider 
trading law execution and the value of cash is statistically insignificant for all periods, but 
corporate-level transparency as measured by the number of analysts is weakly negatively related 
to ADR firms’ cash value before 2007 after controlling for the fixed effects.  
The second chapter attempts to assess the relative importance of superior information and 
hedging in institutional trading in equity index futures in the Taiwan Futures market for the 
sample period of January to June 2012. Based on the methodology by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, 
and Wang (2002), we find that, for the market as a whole, significant informed trading or 
hedging frequently occur, and the opening minutes tend to be associated with a greater portion of 
trading motivated by hedging. More important to our purpose, for foreign institutions the 
absolute value of institutional order imbalance tends to be greater on days when the overall 
market’s informed trading is greater in the cases of regular contract on Taiwan composite index 
futures and electronic index futures, but for the dealer and domestic fund groups trading is not 
correlated with the overall market’s informed trading or hedging. An additional analysis of the  
viii 
 
relation between past institution trades and current returns provides some evidence implying 
institutions are informed, but the evidence can also be interpreted as their trades, which account 
for more than half of the overall trading, having an impact on subsequent trades.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: ADR, Market development, Risk premium, Transparency, Informed trading, 
Institutional investors, Taiwan Futures market 
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Chapter 1 
The Value of Cash for ADR Firms 
1. Introduction 
The concept of value of cash was investigated quite intensively in recent years. Most past 
efforts have been spent on estimating the value of cash held by firms. Pinkowitz and Williamson 
(2002) declare that the marginal value of cash for firms is around $1.20. Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) indicate that the average market value is $0.94 for every dollar in cash and they also 
conclude $0.13 higher marginal value of cash for firms with stock repurchase. Keefe and 
Kieschnick (2012) demonstrate that for every extra $1 of cash held by public firms, at least 
$1.114 market value have been perceived, and the market value of cash is as high as $1.411 in 
the companies with substantial capital expenditure in R&D. Louis, Sun and Urcan (2012) show 
that marginal market value of cash is below $1. In sum,  previous work point out that level of 
cash holdings, economic growth, investment opportunities, financial distress and access to 
capital market can affect the value of cash (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2002; Faulkender and 
Wang, 2006; Keefe and Kieschnick, 2012). 
The primary purpose of this research is to study whether the value of cash varies with the 
degree of market development, risk premium, and transparency within American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs), which are foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. market; it is among the 
relatively few studies that present international comparison of the market value of cash. This 
paper extends the literature in two ways. Firstly, it examines whether market development, risk 
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premium, and transparency affect the value of cash in cross-listed firms;1 these factors have not 
been included in earlier research.2 The motivation to include the extent of market development is 
that due to the limited access to capital market and high costs of external financing especially in 
less-developed countries, the value of cash is expected to be higher in firms from developing 
markets. As for risk premium, it is possible that higher risk premium discourages future 
investments and limits access to capital market, increasing difficulties and costs for external 
financing, and therefore companies with a large amount of cash holdings become more 
advantageous and their cash holdings are expected to have higher values during periods of higher 
premium. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that higher risk premium in the U.S. 
market reduces profitable investments, thus decreasing the value of cash. That is, the value of 
cash in ADR firms can be either negatively or positively related to the U.S. market risk premium. 
Regarding transparency, on one hand, a higher level of transparency reduces the chances of 
misusing internal capital from management and presents better corporate governance, hence 
increasing the value of cash. On the other hand, the value of cash can be lower for more 
transparent firms because these firms have more access to capital market and can possibly raise 
external funds at lower costs, thus cash might be less valuable.  
Secondly, the study provides a clean composition of international firms by limiting the 
observations to firms with stocks traded in the U.S. stock market. The advantage lies in that they 
are more homogeneous and share some common characteristics. Since the sample we investigate 
are all public firms traded in the U.S. equity market, they are regulated by the same set of law 
                                                          
1
 We use ADR firms and cross-listed firms interchangeably in this paper.  
2
 Islam and Mozumdar (2007) investigate 31 countries to explore the relationship between the market development 
and internal capital holdings and conclude that market development affects firms’ internal cash negatively. As stated 
by them, firms operating in developing markets rely more on their internal cash, thus firms from non-OECD country 
have to reduce $0.23 investment for every extra dollar reduction in their internal cash, however, firms in OECD 
country have $0.141 less investment as a result of extra dollar decrease in their cash holdings.  
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regulations and accounting principles, they are likely to have less information asymmetry and 
have more investor protections compared to public firms outside the U.S. (Chen, Chen and Wei, 
2009; Lang, Lins and Miller, 2003; Doidge, 2004; O’Connor, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 
2008; Lee and Valero, 2010). Many studies demonstrate the problems that come from weak 
investor protection and the benefits from reduced information asymmetry and advanced 
accounting principles (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Mclean, Zhang 
and Zhao, 2012; Hughes, Liu and Liu, 2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 2006; Drobetz, 
Grüninger and Hirschvogl, 2010; Frésard and Salva, 2010). By examining this relatively 
homogeneous group of international firms, potential measurement problems are reduced. 
Our analysis indicates the following. Cross-listed firms in the U.S. market tend to have 
higher value of cash than U.S. firms during the years from 1989 to 2012. Because the U.S market 
is more developed than most other countries, the result suggests the extent of market 
development is a factor influencing the value of cash. Within the ADR sample, we find that the 
value of cash is lower for firms originated from developed economies than firms from 
developing countries during the years from 2007 to 2012, after the outbreak of global financial 
crisis.3 This suggests that the influence of the extent of market development on the value of cash 
is greater during more volatile times. Thirdly, we investigate the effect of market risk premium 
and conclude that the value of cash in cross-listed firms is lower when the market risk premium 
is higher. Finally, country transparency as proxied by the prosecution of insider trading law is 
not significantly related to the cross-listed firms’ cash value. However, corporate transparency as 
represented by the number of analysts is found to be negatively associated with the value of cash 
                                                          
3
 Brunnermeier (2008) denotes that the earliest sign of financial crisis appears in February 2007. 
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in ADR firms before the global financial crisis after controlling for time and cross-sectional fixed 
effects.  
The rest of paper is as follows: part 2 examines the literature for companies’ cash 
holdings and value of cash in U.S. firms and firms in other countries. Part 3 describes the data 
and methodology of estimating cash value. Part 4 present empirical results for differentiated 
market value of cash between cross-listed firms and U.S. firms and variations of cash value with 
the extent of market development, risk premium and transparency. Part 5 concludes.  
2. Literature Review 
Baumol (1952) reveals the precautionary purpose of holding cash, which can be made 
full use at the lowest costs, and the demand for cash rises with transactions in banking industry. 
Tobin (1958) demonstrates two primary reasons to hold cash, transaction and investment. Firstly, 
cash can be held for transaction imbalances from extra expenditures created by nonsynchronous 
transactions. Secondly, economic units hold cash to minimize possible losses of other assets.4 
Myers and Majluf (1984) report that firms forego valuable investment opportunities as a 
result of the cost of external financing, therefore, substantial cash holdings allows firms to 
undertake all projects with positive net present values. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1987) 
develop a model explaining firms’ limited access to capital market due to financial constraint, 
consequently, firms with financial difficulties are more sensitive to the spending of internal 
capital. By examining the cash held by U.S. publicly listed firms, Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and 
Williamson (1999) find evidence of greater cash held by small firms with greater growth 
opportunities and firms with riskier investment opportunities, while large firms with sufficient 
                                                          
4
 Yan (2006) also brings out three purposes for cash holdings in equity mutual fund industry, equity redemption 
needs, capital expenditure and dividend payment, and low equity market returns expectation. 
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access to capital markets are less likely to hold a large amount of cash. Li (2007) extends Opler 
et al. model regarding the excess cash holdings and explains that firms with greater deviation 
from expected cash reserves have lower ROA, reduced return on operating assets but higher 
borrowing cost. 
Companies’ propensity to hold cash for financial constraint has also been discussed by 
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004), who advance empirical evidence regarding firms’ 
“cash flow sensitivity of cash”, which refers to “cash out of cash flows”. They explain that 
financial constrained firms hold more cash with greater cash flows, therefore generates positive 
cash flow sensitivity of cash. Moreover, by studying the mutual fund industry, Yan (2006) 
documents a negative relationship between liquidity of stock and level of cash holdings, which is 
also positively related to the volatility of fund flows. His empirical analysis also discloses higher 
cash reserved by small-size funds due to transaction costs. Kuan, Li and Chu (2011) look at the 
amount of cash carried by family firms. They demonstrate a positive relationship between 
agency problem and firms’ cash holdings and argue that besides director-ownership-in-pledge 
ratio and the duality of chair, two factors relating to degree of cash holdings in public firms, 
separation of ownership and control and independent directors, also affect family firms’ cash 
holding decisions. Additional empirical evidence has been presented by Lamont (1997), who 
concludes that insufficient cash discourages investment in the oil companies. Furthermore, Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) suggest that inventory, riskiness of cash flow, capital expenditure and 
R&D expenses can explain the level of cash held by firms. Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) 
illustrate financial constrained firms’ tendency to hold more cash during the financial crisis time. 
There are considerable amount of literature on determinants of value of cash. Pinkowitz, 
Stulz and Williamson (2006) associate the level of cash holdings and firm values with investor 
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protection, and they state that weaker investor protection reduces the value of cash, providing 
empirical support for the impact of agency problem towards the value of cash. Drobetz, 
Grüninger and Hirschvogl (2010) investigate effect from information asymmetry to firms’ cash 
values, and they present a negative relation between cash valuations in companies from different 
countries and the level of information asymmetry, which is proxied by standard deviation of 
analysts’ earnings forecast. They also conclude that firms with higher level of information 
asymmetry can expected higher cash values if they have better investor protection and corporate 
governance. In addition, Dittmar and Smith (2007) reveal importance of corporate governance to 
firms’ values of cash by stating that good corporate governance increases value of cash and 
eliminates negative effects from holding large amount of cash; however, poor-managed firms 
have lower cash values and operating performance. Moreover, Faulkender and Wang (2006) 
disclose lower value of cash in firms with greater amount of cash holdings, higher liquidity, 
more accesses to capital market and payout policy of dividends distribution instead of stock 
repurchase. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) report more valuable cash in financial constrained firms 
with more investment opportunities for hedging purpose.  
There also have been attempts to present empirical evidence in different countries. Ozkan 
and Ozkan (2004) find that ownership structure can explain the cash holding decisions in U.K 
firms. Firms hold less cash when the managerial ownership is below 24%, however, cash holding 
increases with ownership, and start to fall when ownership rises to over 64%; therefore, family 
firms tend to hold more cash than non- family-controlled firms due to the ownership structure. 
Saddour (2006) finds that market value of growth firm in France is positively related to their 
level of cash holdings, and that French firms hold more cash when they have riskier investment 
opportunities. García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2008) argue that Spanish firms hold more 
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cash with increased growth opportunities and cash flows. And they also conclude that firm’s 
cash reserves rise as a result of increased short-term liabilities, which indicates higher possibility 
of information asymmetry. Furthermore, they find that cash holdings in Spanish firms decrease 
with more available substitutes of cash. Kalcheva and Lins (2007), by using data from more than 
5,000 firms and 31 countries, illustrate that shareholder protection affects the relations between 
firms’ value and cash holdings. As stated in their study, in countries with strong shareholder 
protection, a weak association exists between the firm values and the cash held by the firms, 
however, in countries with insufficient and inefficient shareholder protection, firm value 
decreases as a result of more cash holdings but increases with payout policy of dividend 
distribution. Lins, Servaes and Tufano (2010), using a sample of 29 countries, find firms hold 
cash as insurance against insufficient cash flows in the economic downturn. Anderson and 
Hamadi (2009) compare the cash holdings in Belgian firms to cash holdings in U.S. and U.K. 
firms and observe higher cash holdings as a result of the stronger ownership in Belgium firms, 
especially in the family firms of Belgium; however, they could not find evidence of effects from 
managers to firms’ level of cash reserves. Moreover, Frésard and Salva (2010) observe higher 
value of cash for cross-listed firms in the U.S. market than counterparts in their domestic market, 
and they attribute the high valuations to better regulation, higher transparency and more 
advanced monitoring mechanism in the U.S. equity market.  They point out that as a result of the 
improved law environment and accounting principles, which lead to improved resources 
allocation including the allocation of excess cash reserves, cross-listed firms in the U.S. equity 
market are more likely to receive higher market values from the cash they are holding than their 
domestic counterparts. 
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3. Data, Methodology and Sample 
We construct our sample by using data from CRSP and Compustat, and we also collect 
data on U.S. stock market from Federal Reserve5 and country-level data from the World Bank. 
The sample excludes financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), utility firms (SIC 4000-4999), firms with 
negative total assets and firms without share code.6 Our sample period is from 1989 to 2012,7 
with a total 544 cross-listed firms and 10,542 U.S. firms, representing 5,822 and 110,837 firm 
years, respectively.  
Various methods have been proposed to calculate the value of cash in public firms in the 
U.S. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2002) suggest a measure derived from Fama and French (1998), 
who relate firm values to earning, expenditure, dividend variables with the purpose of 
investigating how firm values are influenced by tax policy on dividend and debt. Pinkowitz and 
Williamson extend Fama and French method by adding a cash component in order to explore the 
value of cash after controlling for firms’ other characteristics. 8  We follow Pinkowitz and 
Williamson method to estimate the value of cash in cross-listed firms after controlling for firm 
characteristics in each year and changes in previous and following two years.  
Pinkowitz and Williamson method of estimating market value of cash is as follows, 
                                                          
5
 The economic data is from Federal Reserve website: http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/default.htm 
6
 We use share code to distinguish cross-listed firms from U.S. firms. 
7
 Data on equity market turnover is available from the year of 1989, and we use this variable to measure the level of 
market development. 
8
 Another methodology is from Keefe and Kieschnick (2012), who study the value of cash by constructing a linear 
regression model between excess return on stocks and firms’ earning, expenditure, dividend and debt variables. 
Keefe and Kieschnick method looks at value of cash and other variables in contemporary time and in 1-year window. 
However, 2-year is the maximum time periods during which we can predict firms’ performance efficiently (Fama, 
1990). 
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Where, 
Mi,t: Market value of firm i in year t 
Ei,t: Earnings of firm i in year t 
NAi,t: Net asset of firm i in year t 
RDi,t: Research & Development expenditure of firm i in year t 
Ii,t: Interest expenses of firm i in year t 
Di,t: Dividends of firm i in year t 
Ci,t: Cash holdings of firm i in year t 
 
We use dXt to represent the changed value of variable X from year t-2 to year t (Xt-2 – Xt), 
and use dXt+2 for the differences of X between year t+2 and year t (Xt+2 – Xt).9 To control for 
firm size, we divide all variables by book value of assets, and we also winsorize all variables at 
1st and 99th percentile to reduce the impact from extreme values.  
Figure 1 exhibits the annual average ratio of cash and marketable securities to firms’ 
book value in cross-listed firms and U.S. firms, respectively. The cash holding ratio is more 
volatile for cross-listed firms. Cross-listed firms hold lower average cash ratios than U.S. firms 
in most of the years before the outbreak of financial crisis in 2007, but higher during and after 
the financial crisis time. As stated by Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2003), foreign firms, 
especially firms from emerging markets, are more likely to cross-list in the U.S. market in order  
 
                                                          
9
 Appendix provides complete descriptions for each of the variables specified in the model above, and the 
descriptions include variables, definition and constructions. 
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Figure 1. Annual Average Ratio of Cash Holdings 
This graph reports the annual average ratio of cash holdings, which is calculated from the ratio of 
cash and marketable securities of each company to total assets.  
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Cross-listed Firms U.S.Firms
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to alleviate the financial constraint and to enhance their access to the capital market. Additionally, 
Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) conclude that financial constrained firms hold more cash 
during the financial crisis time.             
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for variables in the eq. (1). The mean for market to 
book ratio is 1.56 for cross-listed firms and 1.90 for U.S. firms, with standard deviation 1.50 and 
2.14, respectively.10 Table 1 also exhibits the research & development expenditures, which are 
higher for U.S. firms on average and increase more in 2-year window than those in cross-listed 
firms. 
The mean for cash variable after deflated by book value of the firm is very close in both 
types of firms, with 0.20 for cross-listed firms and 0.21 for U.S. firms, meaning that foreign 
firms hold 20% of their assets as cash and marketable securities on average while U.S. firms hold 
21% total assets as cash typically. As for dividends, cross-listed firms on average distribute more 
dividends than U.S. firms; in addition, cross-listed firms’ dividends payments have more 
fluctuation than the payments in U.S. firms, as indicated by the changes of dividend in 2-year 
period.  
Table 2 exhibits the correlations between variables specified in the model. We include 16 
variables in the eq. (1) with some in contemporaneous term and others in changes and we are 
interested in how cash variable correlates with other variables in the two types of firms 
separately. In cross-listed firms, cash has the highest correlation with the contemporaneous R&D  
 
                                                          
10
 Fama and French (1998) report the average market to book ratio as 1.35 with standard deviation 1.835, while 
Pinkowitz and Williams (2002) exhibit the mean market to book ratio of 1.215 and standard deviation of 0.957. 
Hand (2001) concludes that in the period from 1980 and 2000, high market to book ratio in the U.S. firms is the 
result from rising R&D expenditures. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
We collect firms’ data from CRSP and COMPUSTAT, while data on economic conditions of 
U.S. stock market and data about countries’ development are retrieved from Federal Reserve. We 
exclude financial firms, utility firms, firms with negative total assets, and firms without share 
code. Our investigation ranges from 1989 to 2012, with a total of 545 cross-listed firms and 
10,542 U.S. firms, representing 5,822 and 110,837 firm years, respectively.  We also divide all 
variables by book value of assets, and winsorize all results at 1st and 99th percentile to reduce 
impact from extreme values. Complete information for each variable can be found from 
Appendix, which lists the full name, descriptions and constructions. 
 
Panel A. Cross-listed Firms 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Mi,t 1.56 1.50 0.76 1.08 1.75 
Ei,t 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.06 0.10 
dEi,t -0.01 0.16 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 
dEi,t+2 0.03 0.28 -0.03 0.01 0.07 
dNAi,t -0.10 0.31 -0.25 -0.12 0.01 
dNAi,t 0.37 1.00 -0.01 0.14 0.38 
RDi,t 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.07 
dRDi,t -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
dRDi,t 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Ii,t 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 
dIi,t 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dIi,t 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Di,t 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 
dDi,t 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
dDi,t 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 
dMi,t 0.31 1.54 -0.22 0.09 0.52 
Ci,t 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.27 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (continued) 
Panel B. U.S. Firms 
Variable Mean Std Dev 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
Mi,t 1.90 2.14 0.80 1.20 2.07 
Ei,t -0.06 0.38 -0.04 0.05 0.09 
dEi,t -0.01 0.30 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 
dEi,t+2 -0.02 0.46 -0.05 0.01 0.08 
dNAi,t -0.06 0.46 -0.29 -0.11 0.06 
dNAi,t+2 0.47 1.36 -0.05 0.13 0.46 
RDi,t 0.12 0.19 0.01 0.05 0.14 
dRDi,t -0.01 0.11 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
dRDi,t+2 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Ii,t 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.03 
dIi,t 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
dEi,t+2 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Di,t 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dDi,t 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dDi,t+2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
dMi,t+2 0.79 3.43 -0.30 0.11 0.81 
Ci,t 0.21 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.31 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlation 
This table exhibits the correlation between variables from equation (1). Complete information for all variables is listed in Appendix.  
Panel A. Cross-listed Firms 
 Variable Mi,t Ei,t dEi,t dEi,t+2 dNAi,t dNAi,t+2 RDi,t dRDi,t dRDi,t+2 Ii,t dIi,t dIi,t+2 di,t dDi,t dDi,t+2 dMi,t+2 
Ei,t -0.07                
dEi,t -0.08 -0.51               
dEi,t+2 0.08 -0.15 0.33              
dNAi,t -0.07 -0.31 0.09 0.23             
dNAi,t+2 0.24 -0.11 -0.10 0.13 -0.07            
RDi,t 0.32 -0.55 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.15           
dRDi,t -0.17 0.04 -0.41 -0.09 0.31 -0.04 -0.26          
dRDi,t+2 0.33 -0.20 -0.11 -0.04 -0.06 0.52 0.36 -0.08         
Ii,t -0.14 -0.07 0.05 -0.06 0.24 -0.08 -0.16 0.16 -0.10        
dIi,t 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.35 -0.01 0.02 0.10 0.03 -0.23       
dIi,t+2 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.21 0.48 -0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.20 0.02      
Di,t 0.14 0.28 -0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.01     
dDi,t -0.11 -0.12 0.09 0.01 0.10 -0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.01 -0.05 -0.54    
dDi,t+2 0.12 0.05 -0.07 0.14 -0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.03 -0.22 0.24   
dMi,t+2 -0.01 -0.05 -0.05 0.15 0.05 0.38 0.06 -0.02 0.28 -0.03 0.00 0.15 0.05 -0.04 0.13  
Ci,t 0.39 -0.21 -0.02 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.44 -0.16 0.25 -0.33 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.02 
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Table 2. Pairwise Correlation (continued) 
Panel B. U.S. Firms 
 Variable    Mi,t     Ei,t    dEi,t dEi,t+2 dNAi,t dNAi,t+2 RDi,t dRDi,t dRDi,t+2    Ii,t dEi,t dIi,t+2    Di,t dDi,t dDi,t+2 dMi,t+2 
Ei,t -0.36                
dEi,t -0.07 -0.26               
dEi,t+2 -0.16 0.04 0.23              
dNAi,t 0.02 -0.35 -0.11 0.09             
dNAi,t+2 0.22 -0.22 -0.06 -0.28 -0.03            
RDi,t 0.39 -0.65 0.01 -0.14 0.20 0.17           
dRDi,t -0.06 -0.08 -0.46 -0.03 0.33 -0.01 -0.11          
dRDi,t+2 0.29 -0.30 -0.07 -0.54 -0.02 0.52 0.33 -0.02         
Ii,t 0.12 -0.34 -0.07 -0.02 0.30 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.05        
dIi,t 0.01 0.02 -0.12 -0.01 0.31 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.23       
dIi,t+2 0.13 -0.14 0.01 -0.16 -0.10 0.47 0.09 -0.02 0.12 -0.15 0.05      
Di,t 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 0.00 0.00     
dDi,t -0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.42    
dDi,t+2 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.41 0.14   
dDi,t+2 0.12 -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 0.06 0.51 0.20 -0.01 0.36 0.04 0.03 0.19 -0.04 0.00 0.03  
Ci,t 0.33 -0.22 -0.02 -0.11 0.12 0.09 0.40 -0.09 0.21 -0.19 0.05 0.04 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.10 
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expenditures, 0.44, followed by correlation between cash and market values and correlation 
between cash and interest expenses, 0.39 and -0.33 respectively. In U.S. firms, cash is found to 
be highly correlated with R&D expenditures (0.40) and market values (0.33), while the 
remaining correlations are below 0.40 for both groups of firms. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Comparison of ADRs and U.S. Firms 
One of our primary objectives is to analyze whether the value of cash varies with the degrees of 
market development in the home countries of ADRs. This is examined in two ways. First, in this 
sub-section we compare the value of cash between cross-listed foreign firms and U.S. firms 
because the U.S. market is more developed than most other countries. Then in the next 
subsection we examine, within the ADR sample, the relation between the extent of market 
development and the value of cash. 
To measure the differences in value of cash between cross-listed firms and U.S. firms, we 
modify Pinkowitz and Williamson’s as follows, 
,    	
,  
,  
,  ,  ,  , 
,  ,  ,  	,  		,  	,  	,  	, 
	,  	,  	  	, !   ,                                                  #2%                                              
That is, we add a dummy variable (DUM_ADR) and an interaction term of cash holding 
and the dummy variable (Ci,t * DUM_ADR) into the model. The dummy variable is defined as: 
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Table 3. Comparison of ADRs and US Firms 
This table reports the results from eq.(2). The dependent variable is market to book ratio. 
Complete information for each variable can be found from Appendix, which lists variables, 
descriptions and constructions. The dummy variable, DUM_ADR, equals 1 for cross-listed firms, 
and 0 otherwise. This table reports the estimated coefficients for three periods, the whole sample 
time (1989-2012), the 1st sub-sample period (1989-2006), the time before the outbreak of global 
financial crisis in 2007, and the 2nd sub-sample period (2007-2012), during and after financial 
crisis time. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable OLS Fixed Effects (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 
Intercept 1.01 0.98 1.04 0.62 0.82 1.48 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4469) (0.4721) (0.0800) 
Ei,t -1.79 -1.79 -1.82 -0.84 -0.66 -1.29 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
dEi,t -1.42 -1.48 -0.94 -0.59 -0.70 -0.40 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) 
dEi,t+2 -0.29 -0.31 -0.52 -0.48 -0.43 -0.59 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
dNAi,t -0.90 -0.99 -0.61 -0.43 -0.42 0.16 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0660) 
dNAi,t+2 0.42 0.39 0.51 0.48 0.45 0.57 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
RDi,t 3.20 3.68 2.33 3.32 3.50 1.23 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0055) 
dRDi,t -1.68 -1.01 -2.35 -0.90 -0.98 -0.90 
(<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0136) 
dRDi,t+2 3.34 3.18 4.00 2.53 2.60 2.82 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ii,t 11.78 10.46 17.80 10.27 10.24 0.72 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.7088) 
dIi,t 6.75 6.32 8.75 5.62 5.12 1.76 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1842) 
dIi,t+2 2.69 2.32 4.01 3.57 4.06 -0.09 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9316) 
Di,t 17.49 18.65 16.66 9.20 12.34 3.09 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1490) 
dDi,t -0.45 -0.45 -0.08 0.77 1.61 1.06 
(0.7661) (0.8096) (0.9748) (0.5440) (0.3282) (0.5958) 
dDi,t+2 13.86 14.31 13.28 6.13 7.86 1.21 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4344) 
dMi,t+2 -0.10 -0.08 -0.20 -0.18 -0.17 -0.25 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ci,t 1.81 2.10 1.15 1.10 0.68 0.02 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9296) 
DUM -0.48 -0.53 -0.53 5.96 0.13 4.51 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9193) (0.0007) 
Ci,t*DUM 0.71 1.36 0.71 1.18 0.46 2.40 
(0.0073) (0.0003) (0.0483) (0.0171) (0.4753) (0.0013) 
R-square 0.3830 0.3845 0.4376 0.7712 0.7864 0.8908 
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The sign of the interaction term is expected to be positive if the degree of market 
development is an important factor affecting the value of cash. 
Table 3 shows the results for estimated coefficients of eq. (2) specified above. We reports 
results in three time periods, the full sample period ranging from 1989 to 2012, the pre-crisis 
time from 1989 to 2006, and the post-crisis time from  2007 to 2012, in order to compare the 
differentiated value of cash during and after crisis time to that in pre-crisis time.  
As just stated, of particular interest is the differential cash value, captured by β18. For the 
full sample period, the market value of cash is significantly higher for cross-listed firms. With 
every additional dollar value of cash in U.S. firms, we observe $0.71 more value in cross-listed 
firms after controlling for cash reserves and firms’ other characteristics. Additionally, the 
evidence here indicates that the value of cash is higher in cross-listed firms than in U.S. firms 
especially before the financial crisis. For every extra dollar of cash increased in U.S. firms before 
the crisis, we find $1.36 higher market value in cross-listed firms over and above that for the U.S. 
firms. However, after the financial disruption in 2007, the value of cash in cross-listed firms is 
$0.71 above that in U.S. firms, lower than the level in the pre-crisis time. One possible reason is 
that cross-listed firms have fewer profitable investment opportunities as a result of the global 
financial crisis. Fewer profitable projects lower the value of cash for cross-listed firms; 
nevertheless, the value of cash in cross-listed firms is still higher than that in U.S. firms.  
We conduct the Hausman test and observe time and cross-sectional fixed effects. The 
value of cash remains different between the two groups of firms after we control the yearly and 
firms’ fixed effects: The value of cash is $1.18 more for cross-listed firms than U.S. firms 
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throughout the whole sample period for each additional dollar of cash, with $0.46 more before 
the financial crisis, and $2.40 more since the year of 2007. In sum, the value of cash is greater 
for ADRs than for U.S. firms. Since the U.S. market is more developed than most other countries, 
this result is consistent with our expectation. 
Other noteworthy results are as follows, cross-listed firms tend to have lower market 
value than U.S. firms after controlling for firms’ characteristics both in full sample period and in 
two sub-sample periods. For every additional dollar of market value increased in U.S. firms, we 
observe $0.48 lower market value from cross-listed firms.11  
4.2   Market Development 
The analysis in the previous section arguably is not very precise because some ADRs are 
based in advanced markets such as the U.K. Therefore, from this point on we concentrate on 
ADR firms and exclude U.S. stocks. As argued in the introduction, the ADR firms are relatively 
larger and more established than their domestic counterparts, and therefore ADR firms arguably 
represent a clean sample of international firms.  
We expect that cash is more valuable in firms from less developed market due to fewer 
and less efficient financing channels and higher costs of external financing. We follow Levine 
and Zervos (1998) for the measure of market development, which is computed as the ratio of 
equity market turnover to GDP.  
To explore the relationship between market development and the value of cash in all 
cross-listed firms more directly, the following regression analysis is performed. 
 
                                                          
11
 Litvak (2007) reveals that stock prices for all cross-listed firms in the U.S. stock exchange decrease as a result of 
the passage and enforcement of Sarbanes-Oxley Act from 2001 to 2005. 
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Table 4. Effects of Market Development 
 
The table shows the effects of market development, controlling for other factors using eq. (3). 
The dependent variable is the market to book ratio. Complete information for each variable can 
be found from Appendix, which lists variables, descriptions and constructions. We measure the 
level of market development by following Levine and Zervos (1998), who measure market 
development by using the ratio of equity market turnover to GDP. We present results for full 
sample period, 1989 to 2012, the pre-crisis time, 1989 to 2006, and post-crisis time, 2007 to 
2012. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable OLS Fixed Effects (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.64 0.67 0.51 0.85 1.29 1.12 
(<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0050) (0.0013) (<.0001) 
Ei,t -0.60 -0.48 0.00 0.10 0.17 -0.40 
(0.0982) (0.3339) (0.9953) (0.8434) (0.7898) (0.5429) 
dEi,t -3.08 -2.62 -3.35 -1.60 -1.32 -1.59 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0021) (<.0001) 
dEi,t+2 1.35 0.71 2.25 1.08 0.07 1.49 
(<.0001) (0.0650) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8201) (<.0001) 
dNAi,t -0.50 -0.51 -0.32 -0.14 0.45 -0.02 
(0.0159) (0.0716) (0.1900) (0.3945) (0.0401) (0.9286) 
dNAi,t+2 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.22 0.16 0.39 
(0.5474) (0.9618) (0.0997) (0.0118) (0.1253) (0.0044) 
RDi,t 3.51 3.02 4.53 7.09 1.87 2.31 
(<.0001) (0.0123) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2471) (0.2983) 
dRDi,t -9.84 -10.93 -7.84 -2.91 -6.61 -6.05 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0084) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
dRDi,t+2 6.51 5.66 8.43 7.69 4.16 11.43 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ii,t 9.10 10.49 6.79 12.04 -1.70 25.83 
(0.0183) (0.0514) (0.1290) (0.0080) (0.7856) (0.0006) 
dIi,t 1.85 -0.95 0.34 1.22 -10.94 10.80 
(0.7419) (0.8918) (0.9685) (0.7818) (0.0578) (0.0603) 
dIi,t+2 -0.06 0.85 -6.19 4.74 6.45 -3.88 
(0.9875) (0.8643) (0.1296) (0.0704) (0.0617) (0.2572) 
Di,t 22.37 25.33 18.00 11.98 2.05 10.63 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) (0.6631) (0.0090) 
dDi,t 2.42 2.68 3.59 2.34 -0.80 2.15 
(0.5278) (0.6375) (0.3280) (0.4201) (0.8356) (0.4573) 
dDi,t+2 12.22 12.34 7.97 5.70 4.25 4.47 
(<.0001) (0.0003) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0921) (0.0206) 
dMi,t+2 -0.14 -0.11 -0.24 -0.31 -0.26 -0.26 
(<.0001) (0.0081) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
Ci,t 1.97 1.93 2.26 1.63 1.19 0.68 
(<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0005) (0.0418) (0.3153) 
DEV -0.56 -0.87 0.11 0.72 1.25 -0.29 
(0.0783) (0.0303) (0.7999) (0.1137) (0.0207) (0.6191) 
Ci,t*DEV 0.60 2.39 -2.96 -1.08 -1.46 -1.55 
(0.6606) (0.1911) (0.0630) (0.1326) (0.1131) (0.1009) 
R-square 0.4463 0.4043 0.7263 0.8517 0.8787 0.9710 
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Where DEV is the ratio of market development as calculated from Levine and Zervos method. 
Table 4 shows the value of cash is not significantly related to the extent of market 
development for the full sample period and for pre-crisis period, but during the post-crisis period, 
the value of cash is significantly lower for companies coming from countries with higher level of 
market development. Our findings show that the marginal cash value is $2.96 lower for firms 
from more developed countries in post-crisis time and the relationship is still significantly 
negative after we control the yearly and cross-sectional fixed effects. This is in agreement with 
the notion that cash is more valuable in firms originated from developing markets, though only 
for the years after the outbreak of financial crisis in 2007. One possible explanation for the lack 
of significance before crisis and significant relation after is that the extent of market development 
is less important during stable time, but becomes important when the financial market is more 
volatile. That is, the results suggest the importance of market development varies over time and 
is more important during more volatile time. 
4.3   Risk Premium 
In this subsection, we analyze the relation between the value of cash and risk premium. 
First, we estimate risk premium using the approach in Petkova and Zhang (2005), which 
compares the risk for value stock to the risk for growth stock and examine the risk premium for 
both types of stocks. They estimate the risk premium by building a linear regression model 
between the market excess return and four variables:  
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-  <-  <  :,	                             (4) 
Where, 
:,	: market excess return in time t+1, return on the  market index minus 1-month T-bill rate 
as risk-free rate. 
; : dividend yield in time t, aggregate dividends of CRSP value-weighted portfolios over 
market index. 
-: default spread in time t, the yield spread between Moody’s BAA bond rate and AAA bond 
rate. 
<-: term spread in time t, differences of 10-year T-bond rate and 1-year T-bond rate 
<: 1-month T-bill rate in time t 
The estimated market risk premium in time t is therefore constructed as follows: 
=>  ?  @	;  @-  @<-  @<                                 #5% 
The estimated annual market risk premium is shown in Figure 2. We incorporate the 
annual average risk premium to our model as follows: 
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where RP is the annual average market risk premium. 
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Figure 2. Annual Average Market Risk Premiums 
 
This graph exhibits the average market risk premium each year from 1989 to 2012. We follow 
Petkova and Zhang (2005) for the method of calculating the market risk premium. The model is 
as follows: 
 
:,	    	;  -  <-  <  :,	                           (4) 
:,	: market excess return in time t+1, return on the  market index minus 1-month T-bill rate 
as risk-free rate 
; :dividend yield in time t, aggregate dividends of CRSP value-weighted portfolios over 
market index  
-: default spread in time t, the yield spread between Moody’s BAA bond rate and AAA bond 
rate. 
<-: term spread in time t, differences of 10-year T-bond rate and 1-year T-bond rate 
<: 1-month T-bill rate in time t 
The estimated market risk premium in time t is therefore constructed as follows: 
=>  ?  @	;  @-  @<-  @<                                 #5% 
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Therefore, we measure the value of cash in cross-listed firms after controlling for firm 
characteristics and market risk premium. The results are shown in Table 5. The interaction of Ci,t 
* RP is negative and significant at the 1% level for the entire sample period, and the negative 
coefficient implies that the marginal value of cash in all cross-listed firm decreases as market 
risk premium increases. This finding suggests that cash is less valuable during the time when 
market risk premium is higher. Our interpretation is that fewer profitable investment projects 
exist when the risk premium is higher; stated differently, firms cannot take full use of cash 
during periods of high premium.  
4.4 Transparency 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) study insider trading from 103 countries by investigating 
the laws and regulations in these countries. Up to the year of 2000, 16 countries have not 
established any law/regulation that prevents the insider trading; among the remaining 87 
countries, only 37 imposed the insider trading law. We measure the country transparency by 
using the imposition of insider trading law based on Bhattacharya and Daouk’s survey. A 
dummy (DUM_LAW) is created to distinguish countries with law prosecution from countries 
without prosecution and countries without insider trading law. The dummy is defined as follows: 
_CD  '0, )*+ 2*EF5+.60 * F*5 ./G*06 .F0.6+ 5+H.FI 4HJ1,       )*+ 2*EF5+.60 ./G*0.FI .F0.6+ 5+H.FI 4HJ 7 
We estimate the following:  
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Table 5. Risk Premium 
 
The table reports the results from eq. (6), which shows how value of cash in cross-listed firms 
varies with U.S. market risk premium after controlling for firms’ characteristics. Complete 
information for each variable can be found from Appendix, which lists the variables, descriptions 
and constructions. The dependent variable is market to book ratio. We calculate market risk 
premium by using Petkov and Zhang (2005) method. Panel A measures the relationship between 
U.S. market risk premium and the value of cash in cross-listed firms. We present results for full 
sample period, 1989 to 2012, the pre-crisis time, 1989 to 2006, and post-crisis time, 2007 to 
2012. Panel B compares the cash valuation during the time with lower risk premium to that with 
high risk premium. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Comparing value of cash with annual average risk premium 
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable 
OLS Fixed Effects 
(1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 
Intercept 1.05 0.97 1.00 6.88 0.70 5.55 
(<.0001) (0.0006) (0.0035) (<.0001) (0.1638) (<.0001) 
Ei,t -0.16 -0.15 0.37 0.28 0.44 -0.36 
(0.6561) (0.7628) (0.4505) (0.5338) (0.4698) (0.6362) 
dEi,t -2.62 -2.47 -1.78 -1.37 -1.17 -0.91 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0010) (<.0001) (0.0032) (0.0298) 
dEi,t+2 1.99 1.45 2.03 1.21 0.07 1.12 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.8200) (0.0011) 
dNAi,t -0.66 -0.62 -0.63 -0.18 0.43 -0.05 
(0.0009) (0.0276) (0.0134) (0.2279) (0.0481) (0.8415) 
dNAi,t+2 0.30 0.04 1.09 0.27 0.16 0.65 
(0.0047) (0.7938) (<.0001) (0.0013) (0.1183) (<.0001) 
RDi,t 3.31 2.15 6.13 7.03 1.18 2.79 
(<.0001) (0.0689) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4661) (0.3651) 
dRDi,t -7.47 -10.24 -2.78 -2.41 -7.50 -4.73 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1347) (0.0216) (<.0001) (0.0208) 
dRDi,t+2 7.31 6.02 10.92 7.53 3.54 12.63 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) 
Ii,t 9.70 11.55 9.33 9.88 1.95 6.88 
(0.0082) (0.0205) (0.0739) (0.0218) (0.7385) (0.4745) 
dIi,t 3.56 1.07 10.21 2.73 -6.42 11.41 
(0.4981) (0.8767) (0.1856) (0.4973) (0.2400) (0.0688) 
dIi,t+2 -2.07 1.77 -13.79 4.42 6.02 -8.75 
(0.5425) (0.7202) (0.0011) (0.0856) (0.0797) (0.0645) 
Di,t 12.97 20.19 5.50 7.66 5.64 1.54 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0284) (0.0026) (0.2278) (0.5636) 
dDi,t 0.22 2.44 -2.53 1.45 0.30 0.18 
(0.9488) (0.6372) (0.5098) (0.5482) (0.9326) (0.9475) 
dDi,t+2 8.10 10.41 2.65 3.19 3.86 0.38 
(0.0001) (0.0011) (0.2776) (0.0554) (0.1315) (0.8299) 
dMi,t+2 -0.09 -0.02 -0.31 -0.30 -0.25 -0.37 
(0.0034) (0.6495) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
RP -88.99 -112.41 -53.79 81.56 211.94 82.51 
(0.0203) (0.0374) (0.3469) (0.4422) (0.0286) (0.2819) 
Ci,t 3.62 3.24 3.68 2.11 0.94 2.66 
(<.0001) (0.0013) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1852) (0.0002) 
Ci,t*RP -336.54 -101.41 -506.57 -165.22 -232.80 -334.69 
(0.0094) (0.6478) (0.0017) (0.0781) (0.1008) (0.0017) 
R-square 0.4360 0.4154 0.6160 0.8612 0.8822 0.9435 
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Panel A of Table 6 reports the results by using the country transparency indicator variable. 
The interaction term of Ci,t * DUM_LAW is not significant even at the 10% level, implying that 
the value of cash is not affected by the country transparency as proxied by whether the country 
imposes insider trading law or not.12 
Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) measure corporate transparency from the 
perspective of availability of firms’ financial disclosure, which can be captured by different 
variables, and the number of analysts is one among a few of proxies representing the magnitude 
of firms’ information acquisition. 
We follow Bushman et al. to estimate the level of corporate transparency by using the 
number of analysts and measure the value of cash after taking this measure of corporate 
transparency into consideration. To examine the impact from corporate transparency, we 
estimate:  
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where ANALYSTi is the corporate transparency as proxied by the number of analysts. 
                                                          
12
 Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) suggest an alternative measure of corporate transparency, which can be 
represented by “the average rank of countries’ per capita number of media”, however, this method was challenged 
by Miller (2004), who states that this measure is rather ambiguous as it fails to define clearly how the number of 
media can be measured. 
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Table 6. Transparency 
The table shows how value of cash in cross-listed firms varies with country and corporate 
transparency after controlling for firms’ characteristics. The dependent variable is market to 
book ratio. Complete information for each variable can be found from Appendix, which lists 
variables, descriptions and constructions. Panel A reports the results from eq. (7), which 
examines the effect from country transparency to the cross-listed firms’ value of cash. 
DUM_LAW equals 1 for countries imposing insider trading law, and 0 otherwise. Panel B 
reports the results from eq. (8), which investigates whether and how corporate transparency 
affects the cross-listed firms’ cash value. ANALYST is the number of analysts in every company. 
We present results for full sample period, 1989 to 2012, the pre-crisis time, 1989 to 2006, and 
post-crisis time, 2007 to 2012. The p-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
Panel A. Country Transparency 
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable OLS Fixed Effects (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.52 0.28 0.76 0.90 0.99 1.64 
(0.0049) (0.2812) (<.0001) (0.0528) (0.1123) (<.0001) 
Ei,t -0.62 -0.48 0.01 0.03 0.24 -0.40 
(0.0891) (0.3417) (0.9832) (0.9544) (0.7130) (0.5453) 
dEi,t -3.11 -2.63 -3.20 -1.59 -1.24 -1.56 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0055) (<0.0001) 
dEi,t+2 1.37 0.75 2.21 1.06 0.03 1.48 
(<.0001) (0.0542) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.9285) (<0.0001) 
dNAi,t -0.52 -0.55 -0.30 -0.18 0.35 0.02 
(0.0141) (0.0573) (0.2340) (0.2638) (0.1271) (0.9126) 
dNAi,t+2 0.06 -0.01 0.38 0.24 0.17 0.39 
(0.5980) (0.9629) (0.0485) (0.0077) (0.1028) (0.0047) 
RDi,t 3.49 2.97 5.09 7.39 2.02 2.35 
(0.0001) (0.0159) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.2218) (0.2972) 
dRDi,t -9.82 -10.95 -7.36 -3.18 -7.66 -6.01 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0042) (<.0001) (<0.0001) 
dRDi,t+2 6.44 5.57 8.41 7.82 4.27 11.29 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<0.0001) 
Ii,t 8.76 10.47 7.16 12.21 -0.93 24.65 
(0.0252) (0.0556) (0.1176) (0.0077) (0.8857) (0.0015) 
dIi,t 1.17 -0.65 0.18 1.93 -7.79 11.37 
(0.8383) (0.9270) (0.9837) (0.6645) (0.1875) (0.0518) 
dIi,t+2 0.41 1.19 -6.68 4.56 5.47 -4.31 
(0.9088) (0.8129) (0.1104) (0.0843) (0.1228) (0.2193) 
Di,t 20.08 23.68 15.79 10.38 1.11 9.78 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0020) (0.8180) (0.0160) 
dDi,t 1.53 2.14 1.82 1.00 -1.14 1.61 
(0.6844) (0.7016) (0.6194) (0.7194) (0.7622) (0.5696) 
dDi,t+2 12.01 12.03 7.42 5.29 3.33 4.49 
(<.0001) (0.0005) (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.1964) (0.0202) 
dMi,t+2 -0.14 -0.10 -0.24 -0.31 -0.27 -0.25 
(<.0001) (0.0174) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<0.0001) 
DUM_LAW 0.09 0.31 -0.22 -4.10 -0.82 -0.44 
(0.5774) (0.1912) (0.2102) (<.0001) (0.4646) (0.3066) 
Ci,t 1.86 3.16 0.68 1.53 2.52 -1.69 
(0.1228) (0.0760) (0.5353) (0.3505) (0.2405) (0.2379) 
Ci,t*DUM_LAW 0.11 -0.99 0.94 -0.72 -3.03 2.38 
(0.9321) (0.5832) (0.4171) (0.6681) (0.1662) (0.1941) 
R-square 0.4416 0.3983 0.7225 0.8527 0.8745 0.9713 
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Table 6. Transparency (continued) 
Panel B. Corporate Transparency 
Estimated Coefficients 
Variable OLS Fixed Effects (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 (1) 1989-2012 (2) 1989-2007 (3) 2007-2012 
Intercept 0.39 0.25 0.58 7.99 1.92 6.47 
(0.0243) (0.3446) (0.0069) (<.0001) (0.0090) (<.0001) 
Ei,t 2.61 3.26 2.71 3.53 0.10 2.25 
(<.0001) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.9530) (0.0739) 
dEi,t -2.53 -3.37 -0.75 -0.98 -3.40 -1.20 
(0.0003) (0.0021) (0.3581) (0.0766) (0.0007) (0.0921) 
dEi,t+2 3.27 4.92 1.65 2.22 0.51 1.93 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.4653) (0.0013) 
dNAi,t -0.35 -0.10 -0.45 0.23 0.68 0.17 
(0.2658) (0.8557) (0.1795) (0.3202) (0.1338) (0.5367) 
dNAi,t+2 0.74 0.20 1.39 0.26 0.48 0.28 
(<.0001) (0.4452) (<.0001) (0.0760) (0.0395) (0.2264) 
RDi,t 4.88 2.54 6.66 4.98 -5.22 11.27 
(0.0002) (0.2046) (0.0001) (0.0137) (0.1346) (0.0028) 
dRDi,t -11.15 -16.48 -6.01 -7.99 -10.04 -3.77 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0217) (<.0001) (0.0069) (0.1473) 
dRDi,t+2 8.23 6.63 10.98 8.63 1.20 11.06 
(<.0001) (0.0004) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.5064) (<.0001) 
Ii,t 11.46 3.07 24.85 16.29 -6.90 44.54 
(0.0354) (0.7117) (0.0027) (0.0650) (0.6812) (0.0023) 
dIi,t 6.01 8.72 21.89 12.37 -4.06 30.17 
(0.4794) (0.4480) (0.1067) (0.0515) (0.7125) (0.0009) 
dIi,t+2 -9.06 -11.60 -11.12 -4.28 -3.62 -4.81 
(0.0566) (0.1435) (0.0389) (0.3303) (0.5665) (0.4834) 
Di,t 6.78 12.77 1.45 3.41 -0.62 1.51 
(0.0181) (0.0136) (0.6396) (0.2027) (0.9212) (0.5726) 
dDi,t -5.31 -4.81 -7.32 -0.88 -1.08 3.38 
(0.2212) (0.4673) (0.1428) (0.7530) (0.8062) (0.3081) 
dDi,t+2 4.12 8.38 0.04 3.21 8.19 0.91 
(0.1202) (0.0724) (0.9905) (0.1243) (0.0605) (0.6455) 
dMi,t+2 -0.08 -0.05 -0.27 -0.29 -0.21 -0.51 
(0.0281) (0.3626) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
ANALYST 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 
(0.3939) (0.4379) (0.3547) (0.0057) (0.9451) (0.0027) 
Ci,t 2.15 3.41 0.73 1.39 0.68 1.75 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0959) (0.0034) (0.4081) (0.0052) 
Ci,t*ANALYST -0.04 -0.08 0.02 -0.08 -0.19 -0.05 
(0.1595) (0.1545) (0.5019) (0.1324) (0.1001) (0.2522) 
R-square 0.5557 0.6381 0.5953 0.9184 0.9461 0.9587 
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The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. Only one of the coefficients for the 
interaction term of Ci,t * ANALYST is significant: the coefficient of -0.19 for the pre-crisis time 
after controlling for time and cross-sectional fixed effects indicates that more transparent firms 
as represented by more analysts tend to have lower value of cash. This result suggests before the 
global financial crisis, companies with more analysts have advantages in terms of raising capital 
from external market, thus cash is less valuable for them. Overall, the evidence on the 
relationship between corporate transparency and cross-listed firms’ value of cash is very weak, 
possibly because most ADR firms are well-established and transparent firms.13 
5. Conclusion 
Previous work reveal higher cash holdings in public firms as a result of weak shareholder 
protection, financial constraint, limited access to capital market, and different payout policy 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Kalecheva and Lins, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009). Early 
literature contributes to explore firms’ purpose of holding large amount of cash by measuring the 
value of cash. We extend previous research by analyzing three factors, market development, risk 
premium and transparency, which might affect cash valuations.  
Our primary conclusions are as follows. First, cross-listed firms have higher value of cash 
from 1989 to 2012, especially during the years before financial crisis; for every additional dollar 
of cash from both types of firms, $0.71 more market value of cash are observed from cross-listed 
firms than from U.S. firms, and the increased cash value is $1.36 from 1989 to 2006 and $0.71 
during and after the financial crisis occurred in 2007. Since the U.S market is more developed 
                                                          
13
 Bushman et al. also suggest other variables to explore the corporate reporting, such as variables representing 
quality of country- and corporate-level financial disclosure, however, due to the data unavailability, we are not able 
to explore further. Though Andrade, Bernile and Hood (2014) propose an alternative measurement, ratings of 
transparency assigned by S&P according to companies’ financial reports, this measurement only reveals the level of 
transparency for S&P 500 companies.  
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than most other countries, the result is consistent with our expectations that cash is more valuable 
in firms originated from less developed markets. 
Second and arguably a more precise analysis indicates that cross-listed firms from 
developing economy have significantly greater market value of cash than developed market 
firms between the year of 2007 and 2012.  However, the relation is insignificant for the full 
sample period and before crisis. Therefore, the importance of market development on the value 
of cash appears to vary over time; the value of cash tends to be greater during more volatile 
period, which makes sense in that external financing is more costly and/or less available during 
more volatile time.            
Third, when we explore how market risk premium affects value of cash in cross-listed 
firms, our results show that value of cash is lower the greater the risk premium. A potential 
explanation for the finding is that fewer profitable investments exist during the periods of high 
risk premium. 
Finally, we analyze the relation between transparency and the value of cash. We calculate 
the country-level transparency by using the imposition of insider trading law and measure the 
corporate-level transparency by using the number of analysts in each cross-listed firm. Overall, 
the results indicate that country transparency is not related to firms’ value of cash. A potential 
explanation for the insignificance is that most ADRs firms are established firms and are likely 
more transparent, and therefore the importance of transparency is not considerable for these 
firms.  
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Appendix: Variable Definition 
Variable Definition Construction 
Mi,t Market value for the firm i at year t Common stocks outstanding * 
Close price at the end of fiscal year 
+ Long-term debt + Current 
liabilities 
Ei,t Earnings for the firm i at year t Incomes before extraordinary items 
+ total interest expenses + deferred 
income taxes + investment tax 
credits 
dEi,t Change in the earnings for the firm i from year 
t-1 to year t 
Ei,t-2 - Ei,t 
dEi,t+2 Change in the earnings for the firm i from  
year t to year t+2 
Ei,t+2 - Ei,t 
dNAi,t Changes in the net asset for the firm i from 
year t-1 to year t 
NAi,t-2 - NAi,t 
dNAi,t+2 Changes in the net assets for the firm i from 
year t to year t+2 
NAi,t+2 - NAi,t 
RDi,t Research and development expenditures for 
the firm i at year t 
 
dRDi,t Change in the research and development 
expenditures for the firm i from year t-1 to 
year t 
RDi,t-2 - RDi,t 
dRDi,t+2 Change in the  research and development 
expenditures for the firm i from  year t to year 
t+2 
RDi,t+2 - RDi,t 
Ii,t Interest expenses for the firm i at year t  
dIi,t Change in the Interest expenses for the firm i 
from  year t-1 to year t 
Ii,t-2 - Ii,t 
dIi,t+2 Change in the  Interest expenses for the firm i 
from  year t to year t+2 
Ii,t+2 - Ii,t 
Di,t Dividends  for the firm I at year t  
dDi,t Change in the dividends for the firm i from 
year t-1 to year t 
Di,t-2 - Di,t 
dDi,t+2 Change in the dividends for the firm i from  
year t to year t+2 
Di,t+2 - Di,t 
dMi,t+2 Change in the market value for the firm i from  
year t to year t+2 
Mi,t+2 - Mi,t 
Ci,t Cash holdings for the firm i at year t  
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Chapter 2 
Why Do Institutional Traders Trade Stock Index Futures? The Case of Stock 
Index Futures in Taiwan Futures Market 
1. Introduction 
Motivations for trading in futures generally include superior information, hedging and 
others such as arbitrage, noise trading, liquidity trading, and trading based on technical rules. 
This study attempts to evaluate the relative importance of institutional traders’ motivations in 
trading of stock index futures in the Taiwan Futures Exchange.14  The Taiwan equity index 
futures market is chosen for the analysis because it is among a handful of markets where daily 
information regarding aggregate institutional trading is available. To estimate the relative 
importance of informed trading and hedging for the market as a whole, we apply the model by 
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) to trade-by-trade data.  
Institutional investors account for a substantial part of shareholdings and trading, and 
therefore research regarding their trading is important for investors and regulators. If institutional 
traders are better informed than other traders, their shareholders, who represent a sizable portion 
of the investors, can benefit from their superior information, in addition to the diversification 
benefit. The majority of empirical studies on institutional trading however suffer from the lack of 
high-frequency data. For example, funds in the US are required to report their major holdings 
only quarterly and quarterly fund holdings data is what most US studies utilize. Overall, the 
evidence from these studies is not entirely clear. For example, analyzing the US market, 
Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) suggest that institutional trades have 
                                                          
14
 http://www.taifex.com.tw/eng/ 
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some predictive power on future returns, whereas Cai and Zheng (2004) find no evidence 
supportive of well-informed institutional traders. This study differs from extant literature in three 
ways. First, we employ Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) method that can assess the 
relative importance of informed trading and hedging; in contrast, extant studies do not analyze 
hedging to our knowledge. Hedging activity should be relatively greater in the futures market 
than in the stock market because hedging via futures involves lower costs than those for stocks. 
Second, Taiwan Futures Markets provide daily information about institution trading; the data is 
of higher frequency compared to that used by prior studies and it is also more accurate than those 
using changes in quarterly holdings to infer trading. Third, we analyze institution trading in stock 
index futures, not stocks as in prior studies. While we do not analyze institutional trading in the 
stock market and cannot make any inference regarding their activities in the stock market, the 
results here might still help to assess the information advantage, if any, by institutional traders. 
This is because if institutional traders possess superior information, they can increase the percent 
payoff by trading derivatives that come with greater financial leverage. A study by Cao, Chen 
and Griffin (2005) supports a tendency for informed traders to utilize financial leverage around 
the revelation of major news; specifically their evidence implies more informed trading in the 
option market than in the stock market around corporate takeovers.  
Our study is also related to studies of US stock index futures by De Roon, Nijman, and 
Veld (2000) and Schwarz (2012) that utilize Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
weekly reports on large traders’ positions. Schwarz (2012) finds a significant relation between 
non-commercial traders’ positions and returns, but De Roon et al. conclude an insignificant 
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relation. Because non-commercial traders are often interpreted as speculators, the results in 
Schwarz (2012) suggest that large speculators are well informed.15  
It should also be pointed out that while the Taiwan futures market is not large, there has 
been considerable trading interest by foreign institutional traders.16 As a matter of fact, foreign 
institutional traders were considerably more active than domestic funds and account for more 
than half of overall institutional trading during our sample period, with the exception of futures 
on over-the-counter (OTC) index. Therefore, the results of this study can provide useful insights 
regarding institutional traders outside Taiwan. In addition, this research is among the few studies 
that estimate the extent of informed trading and hedging in the futures markets. The futures being 
analyzed here are equity index futures, and insider information is not likely to be prevalent in 
trading of derivative on a broad index. However, superior information can come from better 
analysis, not just from insiders (Madhaven, 2000).17 Moreover, we compare institutional trading 
of regular and mini broad-based index futures and narrower sector index futures. It is plausible 
that insider information is more likely to occur in trading of futures on a narrower index. For 
instance, advanced knowledge of inside information of a large firm included in a narrow index 
can produce considerable profit to a trader in the index futures.18 Consequently, if institutional 
traders are informed including insider information, the relation between institutional trading and 
informed trading might be more evident in a narrow index than in a broad index.  
                                                          
15
 There are a number of differences between studies that utilize CFTC data and the aim of this study. First, while 
most large traders are institutions, it is unlikely that all institutions consistently leave large positions open. Second, 
the CFTC report is a weekly data, and short-term trading might not be reflected by the data. Third, commercial 
traders are often considered as hedgers, but there is some evidence suggesting not all commercial traders are hedgers. 
For example, the Wharton survey by Bodnar, Hayt, Marston, and Smithson (1995) find that about 34% of corporate 
derivative users sometimes use derivatives to “reduce funding costs by expressing a view,” implying some 
speculative use by supposedly hedgers. 
16
 According to the media in Taiwan, the majority of these institutional traders are based in the US. 
17
 Madhaven (2000) states that: “The concept of an informed trader is distinct from that of an insider, usually 
defined as a corporate officer with fiduciary obligations to shareholders.” 
18
 Leaking of insider information does occur. As an example, Citigroup was fined for $30 million because its analyst 
in Taiwan leaked out inside information regarding Apple suppliers to its favored clients (Wall Street Journal 
10/4/2013). 
39 
 
The sample period of this study is from January to June, 2012. First, a slightly modified 
version of the model by Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) is applied to five-minute 
interval data to assess the relative importance of informed trading and hedging activity for each 
day in the sample period, and we find that, for the market as a whole, significant informed 
trading or hedging frequently occurs. More important to our purpose, for foreign institutions the 
absolute value of institutional order imbalance (purchase minus sale) tends to be greater on days 
when the overall market’s informed trading is greater in the cases of regular contract on Taiwan 
composite index futures and electronic index futures, but for the two other institution groups 
trading is not correlated with the overall market’s informed trading or hedging. An additional 
analysis of the relation between past institutional trading and returns also provides weak 
evidence for institutional traders possessing considerable information advantage.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The related literature is summarized 
in the next section, section 3 provides some background information about the market, section 4 
describes the data and provides summary statistics, section 5 presents the methodology and 
discusses the empirical results, and section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
As stated in the introduction, the most related literature examines institutional trading in 
the stock market, and hedging activity is not analyzed in this body of literature. Moreover, most 
analyze the US stock market and uses quarterly data. Specifically, Gompers and Metrick (2001) 
and Nofsinger and Sias (1999) suggest that institutional trades have some predictive power on 
future returns; on the other hand, Cai and Zeng (2004) find no evidence of institutional traders 
being well informed whereas Yan and Zhang (2009) find that only short-term institutional 
traders (those with higher portfolio turnover) are informed. Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003) 
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conclude that institutional traders are relatively more informed on small firms’ stocks. Duong, 
Kalev, and Krishnamurti (2009) find that, in the Australian Stock Exchange, institutional 
investors are more aggressive than individual investors in the opening hours. We feel that a 
plausible explanation for their finding is that since most economic news are announced around 
the open and it takes resource and efficiency in utilizing the resources to digest the information, 
more resourceful and efficient institutions would tend to be more aggressive. 
A related issue is whether there is herding among institutional traders. The presence of 
herding can be explained by one or both the following: 1) institutional traders are not informed 
and they simply follow the leaders, or 2) they interpret information the same way and trade 
accordingly. Kraus and Stoll (1972) and Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) find little 
convincing evidence of herding. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find no evidence of 
reduced or destabilized stock prices due to the institutions’ trading activities. Boehmer and 
Kelley (2009) present evidence that institutional trading improves short-run information 
environment and price efficiency. On the other hand, Bushee (2004) suggests that institutional 
trading creates excess volatility, and Sias (2004) find evidence that institutional traders’ demand 
in a quarter is positively related to that of the past quarters, suggesting a herding tendency.19 
Additionally, there are studies that analyze non-US markets and the results are not exactly clear. 
These include Wylie (2005) on the UK, Voronkova and Bohl (2005) on Poland, Ng and Wu 
(2007) on China, and Kremer and Nautz (2011) on Germany. While herding is an important 
issue and is related to our topic, unfortunately our institutional trading data is at the aggregate 
level, and therefore herding behavior is not examined here. 
                                                          
19
 There are differences in terms of how herding is measured. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992), measure 
institutions’ herding behavior according to number of institutions that are buying/selling relative to total number of 
institutions active in the market for each quarter, whereas Sias (2004) evaluates institutional investors’ behavior 
based on deviation of each institutional investor’ s buying from the average buying in each quarter. 
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This study uses institutions’ order imbalance (purchase minus sale) to proxy for their 
trading intent because there is a large body of literature suggesting that order imbalance captures 
the critical information contained in trading. Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994), Chan and Fong 
(2000), Wu and Xu (2000), Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002), Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam, (2004), Li, McCormick and Zhao (2005), Huang and Chou (2007) and Shenoy 
and Zhang (2007) find that order imbalance has large impacts on prices and volatility. Lee, Liu, 
Roll and Subrahmanyam (2004) compare order imbalance, in the Taiwan stock market, from 
individual investors, domestic institutional investors, and foreign institutions, and they observe 
greater order imbalance from small foreign institutional investors. In the futures market, there is 
also substantive evidence of order imbalance affecting prices. Ma, Peterson and Sears (1992) 
analyze information flows in futures market and suggest that order imbalance is the result from 
private information obtained by informed investors and induces changes in prices and bid-ask 
spreads. Bessembinder and Seguin (1993) show that futures trading volume is positively 
associated with market volatility, and unexpected changes in trading volume generate higher 
impact than expected trading volume variations. Fung and Yu (2007) examine effects from order 
imbalance to index futures prices and cash index prices. They conclude that order imbalance 
signals cash index returns three minutes ahead during economic stable time, but one minute 
ahead during crisis time. Ning and Tse (2009) study order imbalance with respect to trading 
mechanism in futures market; they find strong correlations among daily order imbalance from 
trades completed through electronic trading system but not through the auction market. In 
addition, the evidence indicates that investors’ trading behavior is less likely to be influenced by 
past price changes in the electronic trading system. Li, Endo, Zuo and Kishimoto (2010) 
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demonstrate that limit order imbalance can explain the majority of intraday returns for index 
futures in the Japanese market.  
 
3. Some Background Information regarding Taiwan Futures Market 
Taiwan Futures Exchange (TAIFEX) was established in July 1998; it is the only futures 
exchange in Taiwan and is one of the most active derivatives exchanges in Asia. Currently, many 
types of futures are traded in TAIFEX, including single stock futures, stock index futures, 
interest rate futures, and commodities. Futures Industry Association ranked TAIFEX as the 21st 
derivative exchange around the world in 2012 according to its trading volume. Moreover, 
TAIFEX records the second highest growth rate in terms of open interest (number of contracts 
outstanding) in the world in 2011.  
The electronic trading system in TAIFEX opens at 8:45 a.m. Taiwan time on each 
business day and closes at 1:45 p.m. Taiwan time; the last trading day is the third Wednesday in 
the delivery month for each contract. Investors are allowed to trade no more than 100 contracts 
per order for interest rate futures and gold futures, no more than 200 for index futures, and no 
more than 499 for single-stock futures. The daily settlement price in TAIFEX is the daily 
volume-weighted average price, and is calculated by dividing values by volume generated in the 
last minute of every trading day; at expiration, the settlement price is the average price of the 
underlying index in the last 30 minutes.  
4. Data and Summary Statistics 
The data were retrieved from TAIFEX for the sample period of January to June, 2012, for 
a total of 121 trading days. The data includes trade-by-trade data from all traders and daily 
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aggregate institutional trading. The latter provides trading information for each of three major 
types of institutional investors: 1) dealers, including futures proprietary merchants and securities 
dealers, 2) investment trust companies, referring to securities investment trust companies and 
futures trust funds, and 3) foreign institutional investors. The data provides trading volume, 
trading value, open interest, and open interest value for each futures contract. The trade-by-trade 
data provides, for each trade, trading price, trade size, and the exact time of the order being 
accepted by the electronic trading system. Table 7 shows the specifications of five equity index 
futures analyzed here: futures on Taiwan Composite Index, denoted as TXF, the corresponding 
mini contract MXF that is a quarter size of TXF, and three sector indices: electronic EXF, 
financial FXF, and over-the-counter (Gretai in Chinese) GTF; NTD in the table refers to New 
Taiwan Dollar. All contracts are settled by cash.  
Table 8 reports descriptive statistics of daily institutional futures transactions during the 
sample period. Panel A reports statistics regarding institutions’ positions (short and long) in 
terms of the number of contracts, whereas Panel B provides the corresponding statistics of the 
value of their positions, where trading value is computed as number of contracts * futures price * 
contract multiplier (in Table 7). The table indicates that, among the futures investigated here, 
Taiwan Stock Exchange index futures, TXF, clearly is the most actively traded futures with an 
average daily positions of 123,451 contracts (Panel A) and an average daily trading value of 
about NTD 186 billions (Panel B). The three groups of institutions together account for roughly 
65% of all positions taken. In contrast, in the mini contract MXF institutional trading is 
substantially lower, as roughly 47% of the market. This is not surprising since mini contracts are 
more suitable for individuals. For narrower sector indices, institutional traders are even more 
heavily involved, especially on electronic where they account for approximately 95% of all 
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Table 7.  Futures Contract Specifications 
Contract Underlying Index Contract Size Delivery Month Settlement Minimum Price Fluctuation 
Broad Indices 
TXF Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures NTD 200 x per index point 
Spot month, the next calendar 
month, and the next three 
quarterly months 
Cash settlement 1 index point (NTD 200) 
MXF Mini-Taiwan Stock Exchange Index Futures NTD 50 x per index point 
Spot month, the next calendar 
month, and the next three 
quarterly months. The TAIFEX 
may, on the Wednesday in a 
given trading week, add the 
weekly futures for which the 
initial trading day is the given 
Wednesday and the last trading 
day is the next Wednesday. The 
exception is the second 
Wednesday of each month. 
Cash settlement 1 index point (NTD 50) 
Narrow Indices 
EXF Taiwan Stock Exchange Electronic Sector Index NTD 4,000 x per index point 
Spot month, the next calendar 
month, and the next three 
quarterly months 
Cash settlement 0.05 index point (NTD 200) 
FXF Taiwan Stock Exchange Finance Sector Index NTD 1,000 x per index point 
Spot month, the next calendar 
month, and the next three 
quarterly months 
Cash settlement 0.2 index point (NTD 200) 
GTF 
Over-the-Counter (GreTai) 
Securities Market 
Capitalization Weighted 
Stock Index 
NTD 4,000 x per index point 
Spot month, the next calendar 
month, and the next three 
quarterly months 
Cash settlement 0.05 index points (NTD 200) 
 
 
 
45 
 
Table 8. Summary Statistics for Institutional Trading 
This table shows summary statistics for institutional investors’ daily trades on five index futures 
in Taiwan Futures Market for the sample period of Jan. to June 2012, 121 trading days. TXF is 
regular futures contract on Taiwan Stock Exchange index, MXF is the corresponding mini 
contract, EXF is futures contract for electronic sector index, FXF is the financial sector index 
futures contract, and GTF is the over-the-counter index futures. Panel A reports those based on 
trading value, which equals index value * multiplier (see Table 1 for the multiplier), Panel B 
exhibits the number of contracts, and Panel C presents average index value and the highest and 
lowest index value. All values have been rounded to the nearest integer. 
Panel A: Daily Contract Positions 
Contract Institutions Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Overall including individuals 123,451 30,213 51,569 196,977 
Dealer 35,427 10,955 12,965 60,105 
Foreign Institutions 44,608 14,937 3,034 90,961 
Investment Trust Companies 438 517 33 3,114 
MXF 
Overall including individuals 84,440 21,367 40,657 141,982 
Dealer 12,511 4,355 3,015 23,511 
Foreign Institutions 27,207 7,859 4,095 47,468 
Investment Trust Companies 21 57 0 353 
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Overall including individuals 4,974 1,311 2,012 10,022 
Dealer 1,682 469 669 2,993 
Foreign Institutions 3,018 1,168 625 7,964 
Investment Trust Companies 19 41 0 276 
FXF 
Overall including individuals 6,794 3,142 2,018 15,709 
Dealer 1,716 559 486 3,676 
Foreign Institutions 3,653 1,749 805 9,492 
Investment Trust Companies 17 31 0 130 
GTF 
Overall including individuals 113 76 16 437 
Dealer 79 57 4 312 
Foreign Institutions 3 7 0 30 
Investment Trust Companies 8 24 0 108 
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Table 8: Summary Statistics for Institutional Trading (continued) 
                                                                       Panel B: Daily Trading Value  in NTD 
Contract Institutions Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Overall including individuals 186,015,413,261 47,664,510,895 83,680,010,000 311,186,274,800 
Dealer  53,416,606,041 17,098,259,665 18,611,617,000 91,959,744,000 
Foreign Institutions 67,083,440,298 22,710,900,023 4,921,326,000 145,999,956,000 
Investment Trust Companies       655,091,355 772,321,508 47,415,000 4,464,390,000 
MXF 
Overall including individuals 31,784,964,129 8,302,378,379 14,146,224,950 56,248,156,000 
Dealer 4,700,958,826 1,640,188,528 1,044,123,000 8,390,520,000 
Foreign Institutions 10,236,994,298 2,998,087,173 1,581,820,000 17,183,873,000 
Investment Trust Companies 8,133,612 21,868,730 0 128,116,000 
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Overall including individuals 5,677,388,902 1,689,138,015 2,446,880,600 11,918,076,200 
Dealer 1,921,591,537 568,319,476 711,619,000 3,424,951,000 
Foreign Institutions 3,440,222,645 1,366,041,751 760,196,000 9,554,037,000 
Investment Trust Companies 20,684,512 44,941,748 0 301,035,000 
FXF 
Overall including individuals 5,492,976,674 2,764,286,533 1,563,769,600 13,460,735,000 
Dealer 1,378,220,281 489,511,483 360,182,000 3,182,049,000 
Foreign Institutions 2,954,262,165 1,518,518,861 687,090,000 7,309,249,000 
Investment Trust Companies 13,511,736 24,681,607 0 108,299,000 
GTF 
Overall including individuals 49,176,709 34,405,342 6,471,600 200,381,400 
Dealer 34,051,149 25,277,142 1,610,000 146,878,000 
Foreign Institutions 1,304,917 2,962,175 0 13,279,000 
Investment Trust Companies 3,600,107 10,352,015 0 47,656,000 
 
Panel C. Index Value 
Contract Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Broad Indices 
TXF 7,537 377 6,532 8,177 
MXF 7,532 378 6,536 8,177 
Narrow Indices 
EXF 285 14 249 308 
FXF 809 47 700 885 
GTF 110 7 92 121 
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positions; their involvement on the other two, financial and OTC, is also high at roughly 80%. It 
is possible that fewer individuals possess less insight or perceive greater risk in trading of sector 
indices, which explains their relatively low participation rate in sector futures. The electronic 
sector is the most active sector futures traded, most likely because it is the largest industry sector 
in terms of market value and export in Taiwan and it tends to capture more attention from 
investors, perhaps especially so from foreign institutional investors as Taiwan is among the 
world’s most important electronic manufacturers.  
Among the three institution types, domestic investment firms are the least active, 
sometimes without a single trade on a day (order imbalance = 0) and the absence of their trading 
is particularly true in the case of OTC futures; foreign institutions represent the most active 
group, accounting for more than half of positions taken by all institutions, with the exception of 
the OTC market where trading by foreign institutional account for less than 5%. The 
substantially lower involvement in OTC by foreign investors is an intriguing phenomenon, and 
we feel a possible explanation for that is the extremely low liquidity of the OTC futures: the 
market size of the OTC futures is less than 0.1% of that of TXF and foreign institutions might be 
more concerned with liquidity. The very small OTC futures market means that extreme caution 
should be exercised regarding the interpretation of results from OTC futures. Unfortunately, the 
low liquidity of OTC futures also means that we cannot draw reliable inference concerning 
potential firm size effect because smaller firms’ stocks are best represented by the OTC index. In 
Panel B, based on trading value the institution participation rate is virtually identical to that in 
Panel A, hence no further discussion is offered. Panel C shows the statistics for index value for 
the sample period. The average contract size for TXF is 7,537 average index value * 200 
multiplier, about NTD1.5 million or approximately $50,000 in US dollars. Among the five index 
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futures, TXF’s value per contract is the largest, followed by ETF, FXF, GTF, and MXF. The 
contract size is substantially lower than that of the US equity futures, but the amount is 
substantial relative to income.  
5. Methodology and Results 
5.1 Measuring Institutions’ Trading Activity by Their Order Imbalance 
As stated earlier, we capture institutional trading activity by their order imbalance, 
computed as the number of long positions minus the number of short positions. Figure 3 
illustrates the day-to-day variation in institution order imbalance over the sample period as well 
as the overall institution trading. The figure indicates that while order imbalance from any 
institution group is on average small, its fluctuation over time is great and particularly so for the 
most active foreign institutions. Also indicated in Figure 3 is that overall trading, but not order 
imbalance, tends to go up as the maturity dates of monthly contracts approach, likely due to the 
rollover activity from expiring contracts to other contracts. For this reason, in our following 
analysis we do not adjust order imbalance by the total amount of trading.20  The summary 
statistics regarding order imbalance and the absolute value of order imbalance are displayed in 
Table 9. Consistent with Figure 3, the average order imbalance is small relative to the total 
number of positions (in Table 8), with the exceptions of dealer’s trading activity on TXF and 
foreign institutions’ trading on MXF. The statistics for the absolute value of order imbalance 
indicate the magnitude of institutions’ net positions. In the case of TXF, counting all three 
groups, institutions’ daily average order imbalance in absolute term is about 3,655 contracts or 
slightly more than US$18 million, which we consider as quite considerable. Just like total trading 
                                                          
20
 The correlation between institutions’ total trading and absolute value of their order imbalance is about 0.2 to 0.3, 
depending on the indices, for dealer and foreign institution groups. For domestic funds, the correlation is 
substantially lower, less than 0.1. 
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(in Table 8), foreign institutions account for more than half of all institutions’ order imbalance 
except for the OTC futures. 
5.2 Estimating the Relative Importance of Informed Trading and Hedging 
First, the relative importance of informed trading and hedging for the market as a whole 
is estimated. To this end, for each day t in the sample period, a slight modification of Llorente, 
Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) regression method is applied to five-minute interval data of the 
most active contract during the day.21 The regression model is:  
                	    1  28  38_*G6F  	                        (9) 
 
where subscript i represents five-minute time interval and subscript t represents day, Ri+1 is the 
return for five-minute time interval i+1, which, following most futures studies, is computed as 
the log of the ratio of price at time i+1 over that at time i, Ri is the return for time interval i, Vi is 
the number of contracts traded for time interval i, the coefficient α2t indicates informed trading if 
it is positive or hedging if negative on day t, D_openi takes the value of one for the first 30 
minutes of trading for each day, and therefore α3t reflects the difference in α2 between the first 
30 minutes (i.e., the first six five-minute intervals) and the remainder of the day. The 30-minute 
cutoff is based on the typical trading day’s pattern that trading tends to fall off substantially after 
30 minutes. With five hours of trading in a trading day, the regression is run on 60 five-minute 
observations.22 Our focus is the coefficient α2. If α2 is positive, trading tends to go with the 
direction of price movement, implying some degree of informed trading. Conversely, if α2 is 
negative, more hedging is implied. Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002) apply the model
                                                          
21
 In a typical day during the sample period, the most active contract is the current month’s contract till expiration 
(third Wednesday) and after expiration it is the next monthly contract.  
22
 Trading was less than five hours in one day during the sample period: Jan. 18, the last trading day before the 
Chinese New Year when trading vanished in about the last 15 minutes. 
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Figure 3.  Institutions’ Daily Total Positions and Daily Order Imbalance on TXF 
The graph shows institutional traders’ daily total positions and order imbalance for each institution group on futures on Taiwan 
Composite Index, TXF. Total position in the graph is total institution position divided by 10. Order imbalance is calculated as the 
number of long positions minus the number of short positions.  
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Table 9. Institutional Traders’ Order Imbalance 
This table reports summary statistics for institutional daily order imbalance, VOL, computed as 
the number of long position minus the number of short position on each index from each 
institution for each trading day, and the absolute value of order imbalance, |VOL|. TXF is regular 
futures contract on Taiwan Stock Exchange index, MXF is the corresponding mini contract, EXF 
is futures contract for electronic sector index, FXF is the financial sector index futures contract, 
and GTF is the over-the-counter index futures.  
   VOL    |VOL| 
Contract Institution Mean Std Dev  Mean Std Dev 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Dealer 207.2893 1,369.5800  1,067.4400 877.5799 
Foreign Institutions 11.9339 3,182.9600  2,471.4500 1,993.0900 
Investment Trust Companies -3.4711 161.8586  115.8182 112.6265 
MXF 
Dealer 12.8926 1,690.3700  1,225.3100 1,159.1600 
Foreign Institutions -164.7190 2,179.6800  1,709.3500 1,353.5800 
Investment Trust Companies 2.1240 23.9755  9.1983 22.2275 
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Dealer -0.8843 150.3917  116.7521 94.2009 
Foreign Institutions 12.2727 199.2787  153.6446 126.7300 
Investment Trust Companies -0.2645 15.9315  6.8926 14.3520 
FXF 
Dealer -2.0992 104.5801  80.6281 66.2297 
Foreign Institutions -5.6446 261.6432  204.3554 162.4197 
Investment Trust Companies 0.3719 25.5154  10.9339 23.0354 
GTF 
Dealer -0.1488 25.7671  17.1901 19.1313 
Foreign Institutions -0.1405 5.8156  2.2727 5.3510 
Investment Trust Companies -0.0165 0.2882  0.0331 0.2868 
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to estimate informed trading in US stocks and find α2 is positively correlated with some 
measures of information asymmetry, and therefore they conclude the model is an appropriate 
model to estimate the relative importance of informed trading and hedging. Our use of the model  
differs from theirs in three aspects. First, they use daily data while we use five-minute interval 
data because we want to estimate α2 on a daily basis so that we can estimate its relation with 
daily institutional trading. Consequently, the number of observations is substantially smaller in 
our approach (60) than in theirs; however, a time interval shorter than five minutes might not 
adequately reflect the market, hence not considered. Second, they analyze individual stocks 
while we analyze index futures; as stated earlier, we expect considerable hedging activity in the 
futures market, and therefore the model is well suited for our purpose. Third, we add the variable 
ViRiD_openi because trading tends to be higher in the first 30 minutes of a typical trading day 
and this variable accounts for that tendency.   
The results for α2 and α3 are reported in Table 10. Out of the 121 trading days in the 
sample and with the exception of GTF, around 30 days are identified as having significant 
positive α2 that suggests informed trading and slightly greater than 10 days are associated with 
significant negative α2 that suggests hedging. Together, significant informed trading or hedging 
is present in about one in every three days counting α2 alone -- that is, not counting the first 30 
minutes. As for α3 that reflects the difference between the first 30 minutes of trading and the 
remaining time, again with the exception of GTF, the coefficient of α3 is significantly negative 
in around 35 days and is significantly positive in less than 5 days. Therefore, the results of α3 
imply that the opening minutes tend to be more associated with hedging activity. A possible 
reason for greater hedging at the open is that as new information accumulated overnight is  
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Table 10. Summary of Informed Trading and Hedging for the Market 
This table reports the summary statistics for daily estimates of informed trading and hedging 
based on Llorente, Michaely, Saar and Wang (2002) method applied to five-minute interval data 
for each trading day t for every index. The model is as follows: 
                       	    1  28  38_*G6F  	                        (9) 
Here,  Ri+1 is the return for 5-minute time interval i+1, computed as log of the ratio of price at 
time i+1 over that at time i, Ri is the return for time interval i, Vi is the number of contracts 
traded for time interval i, α2t represents informed trading (if positive) or hedging (if negative) on 
day t, D_openi takes the value of one for the first 30 minutes of trading for each day, and 
therefore α3t reflects the difference in α2t between the first 30 minutes and the remainder on day t. 
TXF is regular futures contract on Taiwan Stock Exchange index, MXF is the corresponding 
mini contract, EXF is futures contract for electronic sector index, FXF is the financial sector 
index futures contract, and GTF is the over-the-counter index futures. 
 
Contract Coefficient Mean Std Dev 
Number of 
Days 
significantly 
positive 
Number of 
Days 
significantly 
negative 
Min Max 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
α 2 0.0001 0.0004 31 13 -0.0011 0.0021 
Across 121 days, α2 is significantly different from zero with a p value of 0.0023 
α 3 -0.0001 0.0002 3 35 -0.0006 0.0003 
Across 121 days, α3 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of <0.0001 
MXF 
α 2 0.0002 0.0005 36 11 -0.0022 0.0023 
Across 121 days, α2 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of  0.0003 
α 3 -0.0002 0.0003 3 39 -0.0008 0.0005 
Across 121 days, α3 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of <0.0001 
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
α 2 0.0018 0.0075 33 12 -0.0292 0.0385 
Across 121 days, α2 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.0083 
α 3 -0.0032 0.0050 2 33 -0.0241 0.0123 
Across 121 days, α3 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of <0.0001 
FXF 
α 2 0.0016 0.0046 29 8 -0.0131 0.0137 
Across 121 days, α2 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of 0.0003 
α 3 -0.0026 0.0039 6 36 -0.0150 0.0098 
Across 121 days, α3 is significantly different from zero with a p-value of <0.0001 
GTF 
α 2 0.0200 0.5081 11 8 -3.2659 2.9071 
Across 121 days, α2 is insignificantly different from zero with a p-value of  0.5968 
α 3 0.3732 4.6814 38 16 -21.7342 31.2632 
Across 121 days, α3 is insignificantly different from zero with a p-value of  0.3823 
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revealed at the open, hedging ratio might need to be adjusted and it makes sense to adjust at the 
open because the market tends to be more liquid at the open. Counting both α2 and α3, about half 
of the days have significant informed trading or hedging. As an example, in the case of TXF, 44 
days have significant α2, 38 days have significant α3, 20 days have significant α2 and α3, and a 
total of 62 days have significant α2 and/or α3. Overall, we conclude that significant informed 
trading or hedging frequently occur, and the opening minutes tend to have a greater portion of 
trading motivated by hedging.  
Not shown in the table, the number of days with significant informed trading or hedging 
is approximately equal across months, weeks, and days of the week. There appears to no 
systematic timing pattern for significant informed trading or hedging. However, a substantial 
portion of maturity days are characterized by significant informed trading or hedging; 
specifically in the case of TXF, out of the six monthly maturity days (third Wednesday of the 
maturity month) during our sample period, four days are estimated as having significant 
informed trading or hedging. Nevertheless, since the number of maturity days is only six, we 
cannot make a definitive conclusion on whether maturity days are substantially different from 
other days. In our subsequent analysis, we do control for price volatility because Samuelson 
(1965) suggests greater price volatility near futures maturity.23  
Returning to Table 10, over the sample period the average α2 is significantly positive 
based on the t test for all futures except for GTF, although the magnitude of α2 is small 
particularly for broad-based index futures. That is, over the sample period, the extent of informed 
trading is small. We are not too surprised by the small coefficients because as argued earlier in 
broad-based index trading the extent of insider trading should be small; rather informed trading 
                                                          
23
 Studies such as Anderson and Danthine (1983) suggest that greater volatility near maturity is a result of greater 
rate of information flow near maturity.  
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in index derivatives more likely comes from extensive analysis of available public information 
and the precision of the analysis is unlikely to be extremely high. We next compare the 
coefficients for different indices. Note that the volume here is measured by the number of 
contracts; since the monetary amounts of contracts vary with indices, the comparison of the 
coefficients needs to be adjusted for the differences. On average, TXF per contract amount is no 
greater than twice of that of EXF and FXF, but the α2 coefficient of TXF is only 0.0001, 
substantially smaller than that of EXF 0.0018 or that of FXF 0.0016. This indicates that the 
extent of informed trading is greater in EXF and FXF than that in TXF, which is sensible 
because information asymmetry should be greater in trading of narrow indices. However, the 
insignificance of α2 for GTF runs contrary to this explanation. We feel the insignificance of α2 
for GTF is due to its low trading and small market size; it is likely that even relatively informed 
traders would hesitate to trade futures with very low liquidity. Regarding α3, again with 
exception of GTF, it is significantly negative over the sample period. The α3 coefficients for the 
two sector indices EXF and FXF are much greater than those of the broader indices TXF and 
MXF, indicating relatively greater hedging activity during the first 30 minutes for sector futures. 
Our explanation is that since sector index futures tend to be more volatile than broad index 
futures, hedging adjustment needs to be greater and more frequent hence greater α3.  
To this point, it is clear that GTF is characterized by very small market size and low 
trading. This low liquidity probably means a very narrow set of traders, and consequently the 
estimated informed trading or hedging for GTF is entirely different from that for other indices. 
Therefore, the GTF futures will not be further analyzed. 
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5.3 Analyzing the Relation between Institutional Trading, Informed Trading, and Hedging 
In the previous section we analyze informed trading and hedging for the market as a 
whole. Next we relate institutions’ trades to overall informed trading and hedging using the 
following the regression model. The model is applied to each index and for each institution type 
separately. 
2  10%3  	|8QC|  8QC  |8QC| ! 8QC               (10) 
 
In equation (10), α2t + 10% α3t is the estimated informed trading and hedging for each 
trading day t, and the 10% weight for α3 reflects the fact in a trading day consisting of five hours 
of trading, the first 30 minutes account for 10% of a day trading’ time,24 |VOLt| is the absolute 
value of each institution group’s order imbalance, and VOLAt is daily return volatility, 
calculated from trade-by-trade data for each day for each index. Our main focus is the 
coefficients of β1. If β1 is significantly positive, then it implies that informed trading is an 
important motivation for institutions to trade index futures. If β1 is significantly negative, then 
institutions’ trades are more related to hedging. If β1 is neither positive nor negative, other 
motives such as arbitrage, noise trading, liquidity trading and trading based on technical rules are 
the likely explanations. Since informed trading or hedging is more likely to occur during more 
uncertain, volatile time, volatility VOLAt is also included. The coefficient of VOLAt, β2, is 
expected to be positive, as volatile time usually calls for more hedging and implies more 
information arrival and production hence more informed trading. The interaction term 
|VOLt|*VOLAt is added to incorporate the possibility that institutional trading might be affected 
                                                          
24
 Alternatively, the weight of α3 is computed as the proportion of a day’s trading volume accounted by the first 30 
minutes of trading (averaged about 20%). The results in terms of signs and significance of coefficients are the same 
with this alternative hence not reported. 
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by volatility. We do not have a prediction regarding the sign of this variable. The results are 
reported in Table 11.25 
Table 11 reports the results of regression (10); in Panel A institutions’ order imbalance is 
measured by the number of contracts whereas in Panel B it is measured by monetary value  
 (NTD). We first discuss our focus β1 in Panel A. The coefficient β1 is significantly positive in 
two cases: foreign institutions in TXF and EXF, and insignificantly different from zero in all 
other cases. The results imply that foreign institutions possess superior information in the 
composite index and electronic index, while for other institutions neither superior information 
nor hedging is an important motive. Recall from Table 8 that foreign institutions are the most 
active institution group, and one reason that they are active might be because they are well 
informed. In addition, foreign institutions might be relatively more informed because they on 
average are larger with longer experience of trading worldwide and provide better worker 
compensations. 
The coefficient for volatility VOLA is significantly positive with the exceptions of dealer 
and domestic fund groups in EXF, consistent with our expectation as more volatile times 
typically are associated with greater needs for hedging and greater benefit for better information. 
The sign for |VOLt|*VOLAt is significantly negative in several cases particularly when the 
regression is run on foreign institutions’ order imbalance. The negative sign means that when 
both volatility and institutions’ order imbalance are high, for the overall market there is little 
hedging or informed trading. It is plausible that the combination of high volatility and substantial 
institutions’ order imbalance make other traders hesitate to trade hence little hedging and 
informed trading for the market as a whole.  
 
                                                          
25
 Standard error for all our regression analyses are adjusted based on the manner described by White (1980). 
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Table 11. Institutional Trading and Relative Importance of Informed Trading and Hedging 
This table reports the results of equation (10):  
2  10%3  	|8QC|  8QC  |8QC| ! 8QC               (10) 
The dependent variable α2t + 10% α3t represents the relative importance of informed trading and 
hedging in the overall market for each day t. The independent variable |VOLt| is the absolute 
value of institution order imbalance, and VOLAt is daily return volatility, calculated from trade-
by-trade data for each day for each index. The p-values are reported in parentheses. TXF is 
regular futures contract on Taiwan Stock Exchange index, MXF is the corresponding mini 
contract, EXF is futures contract for electronic sector index, and FXF is the financial sector 
index futures. 
Panel A. Results of Eq.(2) where order imbalance is measured by the number of contracts 
Contract Institutions |VOLt| VOLAt |VOLt|*VOLAt Adj.R2 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Dealer 0.0000 0.0315 -0.0069 0.0176 
 (0.5326) (0.0832) (0.6036)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0000 0.0514 -0.0234 0.0325 
 (0.0638) (0.0188) (0.0636)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0002 0.0415 -0.1535 0.0211 
  (0.4880) (0.0374) (0.2294)  
MXF 
Dealer 0.0001 0.0775 -0.0647 0.0956 
 (0.2074) (<.0001) (0.0803)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0000 0.1312 -0.0537 0.1768 
 (0.6657) (<.0001) (0.0362)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0044 0.0440 -1.1861 0.0469 
  (0.3499) (0.0058) (0.4514)  
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Dealer 0.0025 0.0809 6.4028 0.0511 
 (0.6568) (0.9506) (0.5583)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0133 2.2091 -15.8952 0.1448 
 (<.0001) (0.0764) (0.0271)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0396 0.5260 38.7578 0.0540 
  (0.5535) (0.6713) (0.2379)  
FXF 
Dealer 0.0009 2.0287 -6.0213 0.0866 
 (0.8520) (0.0078) (0.3683)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0014 1.8971 -0.1142 0.0861 
 (0.6087) (0.0476) (0.9857)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0064 2.0349 -48.6046 0.1056 
  (0.5656) (<.0001) (0.0330)  
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Table 11. Institutional Trading and Relative Importance of Informed Trading and 
Hedging (continued) 
Panel B. Results of Eq.(2) where order imbalance is measured by NTD 
Contract Institutions |VALt| VOLAt |VOLt|*VOLAt Adj.R2 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Dealer 0.0000 0.0318 -0.0056 0.0170 
 (0.6047) (0.0809) (0.6620)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0000 0.0505 -0.0208 0.0302 
 (0.0840) (0.0211) (0.0873)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0001 0.0414 -0.1387 0.0206 
  (0.5584) (0.0378) (0.2608)  
MXF 
Dealer 0.0003 0.0780 -0.0613 0.0957 
 (0.2044) (<.0001) (0.0739)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0001 0.1314 -0.0546 0.1775 
 (0.5935) (<.0001) (0.0258)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0099 0.0441 -1.0208 0.0466 
  (0.3723) (0.0057) (0.4876)  
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Dealer 0.0025 0.0848 6.3107 0.0516 
 (0.6108) (0.9482) (0.5642)  
Foreign Institutions 0.0113 2.2118 -15.5262 0.1439 
 (<.0001) (0.0754) (0.0309)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0334 0.5304 37.6630 0.0537 
  (0.5720) (0.6696) (0.2443)  
FXF 
Dealer 0.0010 2.0289 -5.8613 0.0866 
 (0.8699) (0.0078) (0.3668)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0022 1.8812 0.2337 0.0872 
 (0.5017) (0.0493) (0.9702)  
Investment Trust Companies 0.0090 2.0376 -49.4107 0.1058 
  (0.4917) (<.0001) (0.0343)  
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Panel B shows the results when institutional trading is measured by monetary value NTD. 
The results in terms of signs and significance levels are the same as those in Panel A. Therefore, 
our conclusion remains the same: foreign institutions possess superior information in TXF and 
EXF, but for the other two institution groups, neither superior information nor hedging is an 
important driver for trading index futures. 
5.4. An Additional Analysis of the Relation between Returns and Past Institutional Trading 
As an additional analysis of the information content of institutional trading, the model 
below is performed to examine whether returns of futures are related to current and past 
institutions’ trades. The approach is similar to that used in related literature such as Yan and 
Zhang (2009).26 Based on AIC and the likelihood tests, the appropriate number of lag is one. 
However, we are uncomfortable to make inferences based on just one lag of institutional trading. 
Therefore, two lags are incorporated in the analysis. 
  R	S	  R8QC  R8QCS	  R8QCS                 (11) 
In equation (11), Rt is return on day t, Rt-1 is return on day t-1, and VOLt is institution 
order imbalance. Positive γ3 and γ4 suggest that institutional traders are informed, or alternatively, 
they can be interpreted as institutional traders’ trades move subsequent prices. The latter is 
especially possible in high-frequency analysis such as ours. The ambiguity in the interpretation is 
the reason that we do not rely on it as the primary analytic model.  
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 The main differences between Yan and Zhang (2009) and ours are that Yan and Zhang analyze firm level data and 
include control variables for firm characteristics and that they use quarterly data.  
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Table 12. Return and Past Institutional Trades Relationship 
The table shows the relation between return and institutions’ current and past order imbalance, as 
analyzed in equation (11):   
  R	S	  R8QC  R8QCS	  R8QCS                 (11) 
Here, Rt is return on day t, Rt-1 is return on day t-1, and VOLt is institution order imbalance. The 
p-values are reported in parentheses. TXF is regular futures contract on Taiwan Stock Exchange 
index, MXF is the corresponding mini contract, EXF is futures contract for electronic sector 
index, and FXF is the financial sector index futures. 
Panel A. Results of Eq.(3) where order imbalance is measured by the number of contracts 
Contract Institutions Rt-1 VOLt VOLt-1 VOLt-2 Adj.R2 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Dealer -0.0017 0.0027 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.1041 
 (0.9836) (0.0009) (0.2897) (0.1744)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0608 0.0017 0.0006 0.0005 0.1909 
 (0.5367) (<.0001) (0.0695) (0.0687)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.2377 0.0293 0.0154 0.0072 0.1668 
  (0.0121) (<.0001) (0.0102) (0.2571)  
MXF 
Dealer -0.0381 0.0056 0.0014 0.0012 0.5997 
 (0.6763) (<.0001) (0.0230) (0.0006)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0181 0.0038 0.0012 0.0007 0.4990 
 (0.7567) (<.0001) (0.0103) (0.0369)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0502 -0.0244 -0.0159 -0.0164 -0.0260 
  (0.5475) (0.5031) (0.6619) (0.5224)  
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Dealer -0.0028 0.0198 0.0065 0.0117 0.0367 
 (0.9739) (0.0120) (0.4698) (0.0660)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0534 0.0145 -0.0033 -0.0042 0.0401 
 (0.5211) (0.0155) (0.5999) (0.3554)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0422 -0.0041 0.0262 0.0294 -0.0305 
  (0.5824) (0.9667) (0.7225) (0.7241)  
FXF 
Dealer -0.0871 0.0240 0.0045 0.0112 0.0152 
 (0.4011) (0.0685) (0.6890) (0.3502)  
Foreign Institutions -0.1081 0.0059 0.0002 0.0047 -0.0058 
 (0.2672) (0.3268) (0.9542) (0.3291)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0687 0.1334 0.0060 0.0882 0.0643 
  (0.4416) (0.0346) (0.9445) (0.0203)  
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Table 12. Return and Past Institutional Trades Relationship (continued) 
Panel B. Results of Eq.(3) where order imbalance is measured by NTD 
Contract Institutions Rt-1 VOLt VOLt-1 VOLt-2 Adj.R2 
Broad Indices 
TXF 
Dealer -0.0085 0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0976 
 (0.9177) (0.0011) (0.3483) (0.1729)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0595 0.0011 0.0004 0.0004 0.1954 
 (0.5429) (<.0001) (0.0643) (0.0408)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.2322 0.0198 0.0100 0.0045 0.1656 
  (0.0141) (<.0001) (0.0134) (0.2802)  
MXF 
Dealer -0.0380 0.0146 0.0035 0.0033 0.5803 
 (0.6813) (<.0001) (0.0257) (0.0004)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0116 0.0101 0.0030 0.0017 0.4927 
 (0.8479) (<.0001) (0.0117) (0.0451)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0502 -0.0621 -0.0409 -0.0478 -0.0257 
  (0.5479) (0.5123) (0.6561) (0.4532)  
Narrow Indices 
EXF 
Dealer -0.0028 0.0173 0.0054 0.0097 0.0364 
 (0.9735) (0.0112) (0.4783) (0.0780)  
Foreign Institutions -0.0531 0.0126 -0.0028 -0.0034 0.0397 
 (0.5248) (0.0147) (0.6043) (0.3804)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0412 0.0023 0.0192 0.0266 -0.0311 
  (0.5948) (0.9793) (0.7753) (0.7230)  
FXF 
Dealer -0.0871 0.0300 0.0047 0.0135 0.0156 
 (0.4020) (0.0657) (0.7330) (0.3629)  
Foreign Institutions -0.1059 0.0064 0.0005 0.0061 -0.0077 
 (0.2804) (0.3990) (0.9170) (0.3120)  
Investment Trust Companies -0.0676 0.1645 0.0079 0.1101 0.0655 
  (0.4518) (0.0330) (0.9420) (0.0173)  
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The results are reported in Table 12. Panel A shows the results with order imbalance in 
thousands of contracts. The coefficient of lagged return is insignificant, with the exception of 
trust companies on TXF. The insignificance indicates that neither momentum nor reversal is 
evident in futures returns.27 The coefficient of contemporaneous order imbalance is significantly 
positive in most cases, which is not surprising in that net buying should result in higher prices. 
The results concerning γ3 and γ4 are quite mixed. For foreign institutions, they are significantly 
positive in TXF and MXF, but not in the sector indices EXF and FXF. The relatively weaker 
evidence for sector futures is particularly hard to be explained from the standpoint of information 
asymmetry: as compared to broad-based futures, sector futures should involve greater 
information asymmetry hence greater informed trading, but the evidence here for informed 
trading is weaker for sector funds. For other institutions, the evidence for informed trading is 
generally weaker: for the dealer group, γ3 and γ4 are significantly positive in MXF and γ4 is 
significantly positive in EXF; for domestic funds, γ3 is significantly positive in TXF and γ4 is 
significantly positive in FXF. The results in Panel B are qualitatively similar to those in Panel A.  
Furthermore, as argued earlier the positive signs can be interpreted as evidence that 
institutional trading moves prices. Institutional trading becomes public information after the end 
of a day’s trading and knowing their trades account for more than half of total trading, other 
traders are likely influenced by institutions’ past trades. Overall, the results in this section are not 
strongly supportive of institutions being well informed. The somewhat stronger evidence for 
foreign institutions is nevertheless consistent with our primary results that foreign institutions 
possess some superior information, relative to other groups.  
                                                          
27
 Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) find that Taiwan is one of only several countries in the world for which momentum 
strategies do not work. 
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6. Conclusions 
Analyzing the equity index futures in the Taiwan Futures market for the sample period of 
January to June 2012, our primary findings are as follows. Based on the methodology by 
Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002), we find that, for the market as a whole, significant 
informed trading or hedging frequently occur, and the opening minutes tend to be associated 
with a greater portion of trading motivated by hedging. Foreign institutions’ trading as measured 
by their order imbalance is positively correlated with the overall market’s informed trading in the 
cases of TXF (regular contract on Taiwan composite index futures) and EXF (electronic index 
futures), but for the two other institution groups, trading is not correlated with the overall 
market’s informed trading or hedging. An additional analysis of the relation between past 
institution trades and current returns shows mixed results: there is some evidence implying 
institutions are informed and such evidence is somewhat stronger for foreign institutions; 
however, the evidence can also be interpreted as their trades, which account for more than half of 
the overall trading, having an impact on subsequent trades.  
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